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WHEN THERE ARE NO RANDOMIZED 
CONTROLLED TRIALS: 
A CASE HISTORY OF A CONTROVERSIAL 
PROCEDURE FOR METASTATIC BREAST CANCER 
 
Jeffrey C. Lerner, Ph.D. & Diane C. Robertson * 
INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the 1990s, judges were in the position of having to 
make decisions in cases on high-dose chemotherapy (HDC) with 
autologous bone marrow or stem cell transplantation (ABMT/SCT) 
without the benefit of sound medical evidence, and were 
inadvertently unable to provide a societal check on access to an 
ineffective, and at times, life-threatening healthcare technology. 
This unfortunate circumstance was not mitigated by the ability of 
federal judges to qualify expert witnesses under the principles of 
the Daubert decision, despite the growing use of Daubert 
principles in 1990s.1 The most credible expert witnesses had been 
proponents of this ineffective medical procedure. 
If the concepts of “evidence” in medical and judicial decision 
making were congruent, adjudication would be less complex. The 
case we present on high-dose chemotherapy (HDC) with 
                                                          
 * Jeffrey C. Lerner, Ph.D., is the President and CEO of ECRI. Diane C. 
Robertson, B.A., is the Director of Health Technology Assessment Services at 
ECRI. ECRI is an independent, private non-profit health services research 
agency designated as an Evidence-based Practice Center by the U.S. Agency for 
Health Research and Quality and as a collaborating center of the World Health 
Organization in technology assessment, healthcare risk management, and patient 
safety. ECRI and its officers and staff adhere to strict conflict-of-interest rules 
that prevent owning stock in drug and medical device companies and health 
plans. ECRI HOME PAGE, http://www.ecri.org/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2006). 
1 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
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autologous bone marrow or stem cell transplantation (AMBT/SCT) 
for metastatic breast cancer describes a medical procedure that 
came before the courts frequently in the 1990s. The controversy 
over this procedure and the set of circumstances surrounding it 
created a “perfect storm” that diffused an unproven and even 
dangerous technology to patients before its effectiveness was 
appropriately studied. The elements in this perfect storm included 
physician, hospital, industry, and consumer demands. These 
demands dovetailed with media demand for dramatic life-and-
death stories centered on making villains of managed care 
organizations (MCOs) and victims of patients denied access to 
certain procedures. 
This case illustrates the incongruence and difficulty that judges 
confront when asked to consider clinical studies that are presented 
as medical evidence during a proceeding. Judges have been given 
the responsibility of determining the credibility of clinical studies 
submitted as medical evidence and whether to admit them as 
evidence. Courts that tried cases on HDC with ABMT/SCT were 
not equipped to determine the credibility of the clinical studies 
submitted to them as medical evidence. The authors of this article, 
and the organization of which they are a part, were observers of 
and then active participants in the controversies surrounding this 
technology throughout the 1990s. 
Though perfect storms that include litigation over healthcare 
technologies can still form today, better tools are available to 
discern the credibility of medical evidence. In this article, we begin 
in Parts I-III by presenting this case history and the controversy 
surrounding HDC. Finally, in Part IV, we propose a solution to aid 
courts in the future when called to determine the credibility of 
clinical trial medical evidence. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Understanding the issues that surrounded the perfect storm 
over HDC with ABMT/SCT for breast cancer requires some 
contextual knowledge of breast cancer and the standard treatments 
used. Breast cancer is described in stages 0 to IV and a patient’s 
prognosis is linked in large part to the stage of disease at the time 
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of diagnosis.2 At one end of the spectrum are stages 0 and 1, and if 
detected at these stages, more than 95% of the patients can expect 
to survive for at least 5 years after diagnosis and treatment.3 
Effective treatments are available for this stage of cancer. Initial 
treatment almost always involves surgery to remove the tumor, 
followed by irradiation of the affected breast. Additional follow-up 
(adjuvant) therapy includes chemotherapy and/or hormonal therapy 
to prevent recurrence.4 
At the other end of the spectrum is metastatic or advanced 
(stage IV) breast cancer, for which the outlook is fairly grim and 
effective treatment is more elusive; metastatic breast cancer is the 
stage of the disease involved in this case history. The 5-year 
survival rate is an estimated 26%.5 Advanced breast cancer is 
usually treated with various aggressive chemotherapy regimens—
typically a combination of alkylating agents, antibiotics and/or 
antimetabolites. Alkylating agents have been considered to be 
particularly useful because dose increases are believed to enhance 
tumor response rates.6 But the higher the dosage regimen, the more 
severe the treatment-related toxicities, which can in some cases 
cause death. Major toxicities include liver obstruction, cardiac 
disorders (arrhythmia, heart failure, inflammation), pneumonitis, 
central nervous system disorders (seizures, neuropathies, 
meningitis), gastrointestinal system disorders (nausea, diarrhea, 
ulceration, hemorrhage), urinary tract system disorders, 
pneumonia, infection, hypertension, and other serious conditions.7 
                                                          
2 Lawrence H. Sobin & Irvin D. Fleming, TNM Classification of Malignant 
Tumors, Fifth Edition, 80 CANCER 1803-04 (1997). 
3 AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, BREAST CANCER FACTS AND FIGURES 
2005, at 11 (2005), http://www.cancer.org/downloads/STT/ 
CAFF2005f4PWSecured .pdf. 
4 NATIONAL GUIDELINE CLEARINGHOUSE, GUIDELINE SYNTHESIS: 
MANAGEMENT OF EARLY STAGE BREAST CANCER (2001), available at: 
www.guideline.gov. 
5 AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, supra note 3, at 11. 
6 Edward A. Stadtmauer, Bone Marrow Transplantation for Breast Cancer, 
in Barbara Fowble et al., BREAST CANCER TREATMENT: A COMPREHENSIVE 
GUIDE TO MANAGEMENT, 489-506 (1991).  
7 HEALTH TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT REPORT, ECRI, High-dose 
Chemotherapy with Autologous Bone Marrow Transplantation and/or 
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A. The Genesis of HDC with ABMT/SCT for Breast Cancer 
In the 1980s, a theory emerged that “more” chemotherapy 
might lead to “better” response and improved survival, despite the 
fact that no direct evidence was available that any chemotherapy 
regimen for advanced breast cancer prolonged survival or 
improved patients’ quality of life.8 Since some chemotherapeutic 
agents exhibited a steep positive dose-response curve,9 many in the 
oncology community inferred that dose escalation would produce a 
substantially greater response rate, which in turn would improve 
survival. However, very high doses also posed higher risks to 
patients by escalating the side effects and impairing or eradicating 
the patient’s blood-cell-producing system (which includes the 
immune system). Nevertheless, if the immune system could be 
quickly restored after HDC, proponents hypothesized that the 
procedure might be feasible.10 
Clinical researchers devised various ways to restore this 
system, which involved harvesting the patient’s stem cells for later 
reinfusion, or transplantation, after HDC, to reconstitute the 
system. Stem cells could be harvested from bone marrow in a 
patient’s hip or from a patient’s circulating blood supply. In 
addition, certain growth factors, known as colony stimulating 
factors, could be given to try to increase patients’ production of 
stem cells before the harvest. The stem cells could then be 
reinfused in the patient through an intravenous tube after the HDC. 
If the reconstitution of the blood-cell-producing system failed after 
HDC, the patient would likely die within weeks or months. 
Given that the procedure was very high risk, one might expect 
that rigorous testing would be conducted to determine whether it 
really worked better than standard chemotherapy. But such testing 
                                                          
Peripheral Blood Cell Transplantation for the Treatment of Metastatic Breast 
Cancer, 25, 33 (Feb. 1995) [hereinafter High-dose Chemotherapy] (report on 
file with authors). 
8 Roger P. A’Hern et al., Does Chemotherapy Improve Survival in 
Advanced Breast Cancer? A Statistical Overview, 57 BRIT. J. CANCER 615-18 
(1988).   
9 High-dose Chemotherapy, supra note 7, at 15. 
10 Id. at 24. 
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is not required under any type of federal regulations when using 
drugs that have already been approved to treat cancer. Thus, an 
unproven procedure was available outside of the research setting 
from its inception and the only major barrier to its diffusion was 
insurance reimbursement. It was considered by many to be a 
“cutting edge” procedure and the only hope for a disease that had 
few good treatment options. 
Proving the relative effectiveness of HDC compared to 
standard-dose therapy would require well-designed randomized 
clinical trials (RCTs) that compared the two treatments in patients 
with similar medical characteristics (e.g., age, stage of disease). 
Results from nonrandomized, uncontrolled studies on HDC were 
being published, but none of them made the necessary comparisons 
to assure that the published results were meaningful. Meanwhile, 
the procedure’s popularity grew from the mid-1980s through the 
mid-1990s. According to data from the Autologous Blood & 
Marrow Transplant Registry—North America, from 1989 to 1992, 
the number of HDC with ABMT/SCT procedures for breast cancer 
more than tripled. By 1993, more than 2,500 procedures had been 
performed.11 Trials on HDC increased as well, but not of the kind 
that would yield a definitive answer: 86 studies on HDC with 
ABMT/SCT were reported in the Proceedings of the American 
Society of Clinical Oncology’s (ASCO) annual meetings from 
1984 through 1993; none were RCTs.12  Furthermore, significant 
decreases were seen in the number of patients participating in trials 
for advanced breast cancer over this period. Patients did not want 
to participate in trials because they believed that this new “state of 
the art procedure” was their best hope for surviving, and the 
procedure was widely available because many oncologists were 
willing to perform it. For a patient, participation in a randomized 
controlled trial meant that they might be assigned to the group in 
                                                          
11 Phillip A. Rowlings et al., Report from the International Bone Marrow 
Transplant Registry and the North American Autologous Bone Marrow 
Transplant Registry, CLINICAL TRANSPLANT 101, 101-08 (1993). 
12 Rowan T. Chlebowski & L.M. Lillington, A Decade of Breast Cancer 
Clinical Investigation: Results as Reported in the Program/Proceedings of the 
American Society of Clinical Oncology, 12 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1789, 1789-
95 (1994). 
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the trial that received standard chemotherapy, rather than HDC. 
Patients wanted what they perceived (and what their treating 
physicians claimed) was the best, or only, option, even though no 
evidence existed to demonstrate that it was the better than standard 
treatment.13 
B. The Perfect Storm 
The unbridled diffusion of HDC in the 1990s led to a perfect 
storm. Many circumstances coalesced to create this storm. 
Enthusiasm for performing this procedure was tied to much more 
than a belief in its efficacy even though no evidence existed to 
prove its efficacy. 
National Breast Cancer Coalition patient advocate and breast 
cancer survivor, Musa Mayer, aptly described those times in a 
recent commentary:14 
It took me some time, and a lot of study, to understand 
the dynamics of what had actually happened in America 
with bone marrow transplants in breast cancer. And how 
wishful thinking on the part of patients and oncologists, 
public pressure, heart-wrenching media stories of 
desperately ill young mothers, political and legislative 
mandates for insurance coverage, personal reputations of 
researchers, and profit margins of hospitals with transplant 
beds to fill all managed to widely promote a toxic and 
expensive treatment before there was sufficient evidence of 
its safety or efficacy. 
. . . [t]he prevailing wisdom of the time was that desperate 
circumstances called for desperate measures. Many women 
at the time, including my friends vowed to “go out 
fighting,” rather than have the longer life and gentler death 
that might have been theirs with conventional treatment.  
“If I die,” young women would frequently say, “I want my 
children to know I did everything I could.” One transplant 
                                                          
13 Id. 
14 Musa Mayer, When Clinical Trials Are Compromised: A Perspective 
from a Patient Advocate, 2 PLOS MED. 1060, 1060-61 (2005). 
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unit actually used this coercive argument as a marketing 
ploy. Naively, I believed that doctors could be trusted to 
rely on good evidence, especially for a treatment as toxic 
and costly as this. Certainly, they would never allow 
themselves to be misled by partial evidence or a compelling 
theory—that more is better, or that dramatic tumor 
response in uncontrolled Phase II trials actually predicted 
for clinical benefit. 
The procedure was performed by the nation’s leading 
oncologists who held important positions. Clinicians were held in 
high esteem by patients, colleagues and their professional 
communities. Whether they were at first leading oncologists who 
performed the procedure or whether they emerged as leaders in the 
oncology community as a result of performing HDC is difficult to 
discern. Physician advocates for HDC hailed from renowned 
institutions such as Sloan Kettering in New York and Duke 
University in North Carolina. They published articles in 
prestigious medical journals such as the Journal of Clinical 
Oncology, the Journal of the National Cancer Institute, and the 
New England Journal of Medicine. These same leaders also 
became involved in the contentious insurance issues related to 
access to the procedure. 
Certain experiences of the authors suggest that some of these 
oncologists also had vested intellectual and financial interests in 
the procedure. Vested intellectual interests became apparent when 
we obtained external peer review on the preliminary draft of our 
1995 technology assessment on the procedure. Upon learning the 
results of ECRI’s assessment, a renowned oncologist from a 
recognized cancer Center of Excellence declared that they could 
not possibly be valid—not because of the methodology we used, 
but because the results of our analysis led, in her opinion, to the 
wrong conclusions.15 
Vested financial interests of some oncologists enhanced 
diffusion of this technology, but the way this occurred was more 
complex. In addition to the procedure being performed by the most 
famous oncology researchers at premier institutions, oncologists in 
                                                          
15 High-dose Chemotherapy, supra note 7. 
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community hospitals also wished to perform the procedure but did 
not have the wherewithal to do so. The technical expertise and 
facilities required to care for these patients led some community 
hospitals to contract with for-profit centers that offered the 
procedure—centers in which some famous oncologists had a 
financial stake. Such centers were purely enterprises created to 
bring in revenue by performing a high-risk procedure whose 
efficacy was unknown. It was common for a single HDC with 
ABMT procedure to cost $150,000 to $200,000 in the early to mid-
1990s, although procedure advocates worked to lower costs by 
modifying HDC procedures and creating outpatient facilities to 
perform it. 
Another factor in the evolution of this perfect storm was that 
some oncology professional societies worked with a for-profit 
company to lobby state legislators to enact state mandates 
requiring health insurers to pay for HDC with ABMT/SCT. At 
times these efforts were successful. These mandates were matched 
by decisions at the federal level by the U.S. Office of Personnel 
Management to declare that health insurance plans covering 
federal employees and their families would be required to cover 
the procedure.16 
Physician enthusiasm for the procedure was, however, only one 
element in the perfect storm. Breast cancer became a renowned 
cause in the 1990s, which marked the advent of an era in which 
patient organizations such as the Susan G. Koman Foundation 
became nationally known through events such as the Race for the 
Cure. The National Breast Cancer Coalition also formed and 
achieved the signal success of obtaining extraordinary amounts of 
funding for breast cancer research from the U.S. Department of 
Defense—a very non-traditional funding source for cancer 
research. 
The high public profile of the disease helped to build an 
emotional response to the procedure with the help of celebrities 
and the media. Celebrities affected by breast cancer were willing to 
                                                          
16 ECRI, The Impact of Inappropriate Diffusion of Technology, HEALTH 
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT NEWS (ECRI, Plymouth Meeting, PA) Nov/Dec 
1994, at 1, 6. 
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talk publicly about their experiences and, while most cases of 
breast cancer occur in older women, a disproportionate number of 
tragic cases in younger women were covered in the news media. 
This coverage created greater awareness of breast cancer, but also 
skewed perceptions about the true prevalence and incidence of the 
condition. 
Another element in this perfect storm was the rapid conversion 
of the nation’s health insurance system to a managed-care model. 
Managed care organizations (MCOs also known as health 
maintenance organizations or HMOs) were initially considered a 
socially progressive attempt to merge insurance payment with 
better controlled delivery and cost-effectiveness of care. In theory, 
this merger would slow the spiraling costs of healthcare while 
increasing the quality of care for patients. But the rapid and ragged 
implementation of managed care at that time led to a strong 
backlash from doctors, hospitals, and patients. A perception 
developed that cost was the sole consideration in MCOs’ decision 
making about what to cover. The locus of coverage decision 
making, which resided with medical directors of MCOs, presented 
an unacceptable conflict of interest to the public which challenged 
the legitimacy of managed care. Many different constituencies and 
factors play important roles in coverage policy making of managed 
care plans: the press, lawmakers, consumers, healthcare 
professionals, healthcare industry representatives, government and 
state mandates, business and contractual obligations of 
beneficiaries’ insurance contracts, and the scientific evidence on 
the technology in question. 
Strengthening the storm were media demands for dramatic life-
and-death stories centered on making villains of MCOs and 
victims of patients denied access to certain procedures. HDC with 
ABMT/HDC provided the perfect media opportunity. The media 
presented an extraordinarily one-sided perspective that contributed 
heavily to the perception that the procedure must be good because 
it was expensive and MCOs opposed it. Time Magazine’s cover on 
January 22, 1996, featured a physician wearing a surgical mask 
gagging his mouth, along with the bold headlines “Special 
Investigation. What Your Doctor Can’t Tell You. An in-depth look 
at managed care and one woman’s fight to survive.” 
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The final, though not the least important, element in this 
perfect storm is the issue of medical uncertainty. That is, 
statistically based studies show how populations, not individual 
patients, will fare under a procedure. Thus, even if a procedure is 
rarely effective, when life is at stake it is common for desperate 
people to hope that they are the exception to the rule—that they 
will be the one to benefit. This issue is particularly challenging for 
the legal profession, which most often deals with compelling 
individual cases and is not usually in a position to judge whether 
procedures should be performed by the medical profession. 
Business contract arrangements among employers, employees, 
and HMOs also contributed to the storm and became the basis for 
disputes entering the legal system over access to the procedure. 
These disputes are well laid out in a body of work produced by 
Peter D. Jacobson, J.D., MPH et al.17 One of the key points in this 
body of work is that the court’s reliance on expert witnesses was 
problematic because the nation’s most credible witnesses were 
proponents of the technology—highly respected oncologists. Other 
highly respected oncologists who believed differently from the 
proponents refused to testify for the defense. Why these credible 
opposing voices refused to testify is a matter of some speculation, 
but it was clearly difficult to counter a mounting consensus of 
support for HDC in the profession. Therefore, the defense in these 
cases often had to rely on the testimony of insurance company 
medical directors, who with rare exception were not oncologists 
and also held little credibility with juries because of public 
sentiment about MCOs. 
In the absence of access to credible expert witnesses, MCOs 
that were sued sometimes mounted their defense of coverage 
denials for HDC by citing technology assessment reports (also 
sometimes called systematic reviews) such as the one ECRI 
published in 1995. Several reports showed that no evidence was 
available to prove that the procedure was more effective than—or 
even as effective as—standard chemotherapy. Some health plans 
                                                          
17 PETER D. JACOBSON, RICHARD A. RETTIG, & WADE M. AUBRY, 
LITIGATING THE SCIENCE OF BREAST CANCER TREATMENT (forthcoming 2006) 
(manuscript at 43, on file with authors). 
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also succumbed to the public tidal wave and pressure of expensive 
litigation and approved coverage for an unproven costly 
procedure.18 
The technology assessments and methods used to analyze data 
were drawn into the eye of the storm. From the 1980s through the 
mid-1990s, as the science of systematic review of medical 
literature was evolving, the notion of pooling biomedical data for 
meta-analysis of multiple clinical studies was neither fully 
developed nor generally accepted. And when such analyses were 
performed, only data from randomized controlled trials (RCTs) 
were used because RCTs are generally considered the “gold 
standard” for evaluating the efficacy of medical procedures. 
However, for many healthcare technologies, gold standard RCTs 
often are not conducted—only uncontrolled studies are available. 
So the question for those engaged in systematic review was how to 
proceed. In the early 1990s, no group in the field of technology 
assessment had yet explored pooling data from uncontrolled 
studies—which were the only studies then available on HDC with 
ABMT/SCT. 
Ultimately in 1995, ECRI published a 328-page systematic 
review on HDC with ABMT/SCT for the treatment of metastatic 
breast cancer using the only available data, which were lower 
quality than gold standard RCT data. The methods of analysis and 
results of this landmark review are summarized below. 
II. ECRI’S CONCERNS GENERATE LANDMARK DATA ANALYSIS 
The elements of this perfect storm compelled ECRI to 
undertake a landmark systematic review of the available data on 
HDC with ABMT/SCT for metastatic breast cancer. ECRI was 
motivated by its 30-year mission to improve the safety and cost 
effectiveness of healthcare and its dedication to providing 
objective, evidence-based information to the healthcare community 
for informed decision making. Another motivation was the concern 
                                                          
18 New Wave of Diffusion of HDC with ABMT for Breast Cancer: An 
Answer to the Efficacy Question?, HEALTH TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT NEWS, 
(ECRA, ECRI, Plymouth Meeting, PA) Mar/Apr. 1996, at 1, 8. 
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that premature diffusion of this procedure outside of RCTs was 
misleading and harming patients, and that no one was giving 
patients complete information. ECRI learned how some patients 
were being misled after conversations with patients who contacted 
ECRI for information and from patient advocates, such as Musa 
Mayer, at the National Breast Cancer Coalition. ECRI was aware 
that the procedure was being presented to desperately ill patients as 
their last and only hope without being told of its serious risks. 
Patients were misled to believe that a high tumor response rate to 
HDC translated to longer survival. It did not. Some women who 
survived the procedure were trotted out like poster children to 
provide testimonials of the procedure’s efficacy. Women who were 
denied the procedure were said to have been denied life-saving 
treatment. Unfortunately, patients who died from the treatment had 
no voice, and the oncology community was all too ready to 
minimize or not acknowledge treatment-related deaths. 
Notably, many clinical proponents of HDC claimed that there 
was a “subset of breast cancer patients” that benefited from HDC, 
yet no one had ever been able to define that subset. ECRI wanted 
to find out if that subset really existed. 
A. Elements of a High-Quality Systematic Review 
Systematic reviews have the ability to yield answers that 
individual studies cannot because a systematic review examines an 
entire body of evidence, that is, all the relevant studies. Two key 
elements of a high-quality systematic review are transparency 
about the methods and data used to conduct the analysis in the 
review and the comprehensiveness of the review. Transparency is 
important for reproducibility of results. Comprehensiveness is 
important so that all relevant data and information are considered 
to arrive at the conclusions. Comprehensiveness begins with a 
thorough and exhaustive search for all the relevant published 
medical literature. Comprehensiveness also refers to thorough 
testing of the robustness of all the analyses performed. 
For its analysis, ECRI undertook the most comprehensive 
search for data on HDC with ABMT/SCT that any technology 
assessment organization had undertaken up to that time. ECRI 
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searched 12 databases to identify clinical studies on the procedure. 
Those searches identified 1544 articles that were retrieved and 
reviewed to identify trials with relevant data for possible analysis. 
ECRI found no controlled trials that made head-to-head 
comparisons of HDC and standard chemotherapy.19 At the time, 
several RCTs were in progress but having trouble accruing 
patients. 
1. Problems with the Quality of HDC Evidence 
In reviewing the 1544 articles, ECRI identified many critical 
weaknesses in the oncology literature.20 These weaknesses made 
many studies unusable because of insufficient, uninterpretable, or 
biased data. For example, studies often combined results for 
patients with different stages of disease and other important 
variables known to affect treatment and treatment outcomes. Data 
from such studies were uninterpretable. Treatment-related 
morbidity and mortality data, which are very important given the 
toxicity of HDC, were reported inconsistently or not at all. During 
its examination of the evidence, ECRI found that many studies 
used a euphemism for describing the deaths that occurred within 
30 days of treatment as a result of the treatment. These events were 
often reported simply as “unevaluable patients.” 
Another study quality issue was that many studies enrolled 
only those patients whose disease was known to respond to 
chemotherapy. These patients were given a course of “induction 
therapy”—treatment intended to determine whether or not their 
tumors were chemo-responsive. While selecting patients whose 
tumors are most likely to respond is certainly legitimate from a 
clinical perspective, this practice in a scientific study introduces a 
serious design flaw. It biases results because only patients with the 
optimal chance for response were entered into many of the HDC 
studies. Standard chemotherapy studies did not employ such 
criteria—those studies enrolled patients with optimal and 
                                                          
19 High-dose Chemotherapy, supra note 7, at 34-36. 
20 Id. at 68-71 (noting “dissimilar HDC regimens and dosages,” differing 
prior treatment for patients, and patient selection as some of the problems in 
study design). 
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suboptimal chances of response. ECRI’s analysis showed that this 
practice in HDC studies was positively correlated with reports of 
improved survival rates over standard-dose treatment. Thus the 
benefits of HDC were overstated unless the influence of this 
patient selection bias difference was accounted for. 
HDC studies also adhered to no standard definition or regimen 
for HDC. HDC regimens in studies had dosages ranging from 2 to 
10 times those of standard chemotherapy regimens. The 
combinations of drugs given varied also. ECRI identified dozens of 
2-drug and 3-drug combinations in the literature on HDC. Some 
regimens included administering biologic growth factors known as 
colony stimulating factors; others did not. These growth factors 
were intended to stimulate the patient’s production of blood cells 
to ensure an adequate harvest of stem cells for the transplant 
procedure that would follow HDC. 
Another important weakness of many HDC studies was that 
patient characteristics were vaguely described. Important 
characteristics such as those in Table 1, infra, which are linked to 
patient prognosis (and appropriate treatment), were poorly reported 
or not reported at all in many studies. 
Finally, proponents of the technology often supported their 
assertion of the efficacy of HDC by referencing data from meeting 
abstracts—short summaries of trials that were never published in 
full in the peer-reviewed literature. Meeting abstracts were of 
abysmally poor quality with incomplete and vague information—
ECRI had to exclude them from analysis. 
B. ECRI’s Analytic Methods 
Given the absence of RCTs, ECRI analysts identified a 
statistical method to use on data from uncontrolled studies to make 
indirect comparisons between HDC and standard-dose therapy. 
Although indirect comparisons have inherent weaknesses, it was 
the best available option to try to find an answer about whether 
HDC was more effective than standard chemotherapy. (Since the 
time of ECRI’s analysis of data from uncontrolled studies, the 
international health services research community has developed 
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standards for analyzing data from uncontrolled studies.)21 Given 
that none of the ongoing multicenter RCTs were expected to 
accrue sufficient numbers of patients because patients did not want 
to enter trials when the procedure was widely available, no one 
knew whether RCTs would ever be completed. 
From the 1544 articles, ECRI identified 40 uncontrolled studies 
of HDC with ABMT/SCT on a total of 1,017 patients that provided 
sufficient data to pool together for ECRI’s analysis. ECRI also 
obtained unpublished data from the North American Autologous 
Bone Marrow Transplant Registry (NAABMTR). This group had 
created a registry of data on HDC with ABMT/SCT from many 
centers around the world. 
ECRI identified standard chemotherapy RCTs with patient 
groups that had medical characteristics similar to patients in the 
uncontrolled HDC studies. The literature searches identified 35 
RCTs of standard chemotherapy, which represented data on a total 
of 4,889 patients that could be pooled to make comparisons to 
outcomes of HDC patients. 
After data were pooled on similar patients from HDC and 
standard-dose studies, analysts used a statistical technique called 
meta-regression to see which, if any, patient characteristics led to 
better outcomes with HDC than with standard chemotherapy. In 
layman’s terms, meta-regression provides a way to explore 
differences in the characteristics of patients to see how any 
differences in characteristics might affect treatment outcomes. 
Characteristics are grouped together and run through a model and 
then regrouped in different ways and rerun through a model to see 
what the outcomes are for each group of characteristics. This 
method would enable analysts to define any subset of patients that 
might benefit from the procedure. See Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Patient characteristics ECRI analyzed to try to 
identify patient subset  that might benefit from HDC/ABMT 
1. 
2. 
Treatment regimen given (including induction, purging, CSFs) 
Age 
                                                          
21 Donna F. Stroup et al., Meta-analysis of Observational Studies in 
Epidemiology, 283 JAMA 2008, 2008-12 (2000). 
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Estrogen receptor status (positive or negative) 
Response to previous hormonal therapy 
Menopausal status 
Previous chemotherapy for metastatic disease 
Previous adjunctive chemotherapy (for nonmetastatic disease) 
Severity of metastasis: 




e. Soft tissues 
f. Lymphatics 
g. Contralateral breast 
h. Viscera 
9.  Number of sites of metastasis 
 
For the regression model, analysts used 61 treatment groups 
from 35 standard chemotherapy RCTs. These groups of patients 
had characteristics similar to those in HDC studies. Fourteen 
regression model groups were analyzed for each of 7 outcome 
variables. See Table 2 below. The outcomes ECRI considered 
reflect both the outcomes that ECRI considered important as well 
as outcomes ECRI believed were misleading, but had been used 
widely in the oncology community to assess efficacy, such as 
response rates and response duration. ECRI found that no scientific 
evidence supported the theory that tumor response rates correlate 
to improvements in survival. In fact, some evidence suggests that 
tumor response rates and improved survival are not directly linked. 
ECRI was also interested in quality of life after HDC because of 
the high toxicity of the treatment, but no studies evaluated this, so 
ECRI had no data to address this important outcome. 







Complete and partial (objective) tumor response rate* 
Median response duration* 
1-year disease-free (progression-free) survival  
2-year disease-free (progression-free) survival    
Median overall survival (duration)   
1-year overall survival** 
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7. 2-year overall survival** 
 *Complete means that no tumor could be detected upon 
clinical exam or imaging; partial means that the tumor shrank 
by 50% or more. 
**The standard length of survival time that is considered 
indicative of remission is 5 years; however, the longest follow-up 
that was available in HDC was 1 and 2 years. 
 
C. Early Death Rates 
Patients undergoing HDC run a substantial risk of life-
threatening infection due to the total suppression of their immune 
system and severe toxicity of chemotherapy to major organs—
heart, liver, kidneys. ECRI analyzed the early death rates over 
time. These rates were reported in 31 studies from 1984 to 1994. 
One might expect that over the many years during which a high-
risk procedure is performed, clinical experience with the procedure 
and accumulating knowledge would yield lower death and 
complication rates. ECRI’s review of data over the 10 years from 
1984 to 1994 found no trend toward improvement in death rates 
from HDC. In fact, a slight trend toward an increase in early deaths 
was seen in the last two years (1993 through 1994) of studies 






Table 3. Early deaths rates from HDC over a 10-year 
period 
HDC Studies 
Published in Years: 
 
Number of Studies 
% Early Deaths 
(Mean +- SE)  
1984 – 1994 31 10.5 +- 1.4% 
1990 – 1994 25 9.7 +- 1.7% 
                                                          
22 High-dose Chemotherapy, supra note 7, at 25, 33. 
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1991 – 1994 17 9.4 +- 2.1% 
1992 – 1994 14 10.5 +-2.4% 
1993 – 1994 7 14.4 +- 3.4% 
1994 5 16.6 +-4.3% 
 
1. ECRI’s Results 
Based on published data and the additional data ECRI obtained 
from bone marrow transplant registry, ECRI found: 
• No evidence of benefit for HDC/ABMT/ASCR 
compared to standard chemotherapy in any group when 
patients were matched for important characteristics. 
• Evidence of harm for all outcome measures except 
response rate. 
• Substantial evidence for decreased median response 
duration, median survival time, and one-year overall 
survival for patients given HDC/ABMT/ASCR. 
• Treatment-related death rates were not improving over 
time. 
• Patients receiving optimal standard chemotherapy 
regimens that were available at the time had better 
outcomes than patients given HDC/ABMT/ASCR. 23 
Based on these findings, ECRI publicly made several 
recommendations: 
• Extremely poor quality of oncologic literature must be 
improved. 
• Editors of oncologic journals should ensure that studies 
adequately report details of patient characteristics and 
outcome measures, including deaths. 
• “Meeting abstracts” can not be considered legitimate 
sources of results. 
• The public and patients should be informed of the 
absence of demonstrated benefits. 
• Patients considering the treatment should be informed 
                                                          
23 Id. at 1-3. 
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of its potentially significant risks. 
• The treatment should be limited to active randomized 
controlled trials only. 
III. HDC EPILOGUE 
Soon after ECRI’s report was released, the Journal of Clinical 
Oncology published the first RCT to report on HDC with 
ABMT/SCT compared to standard chemotherapy.24 This was a 
watershed event because this South African trial from University 
of Witwatersrand Medical School, Johannesburg reported a 
significantly higher response rate for HDC than standard 
chemotherapy. At the May 1999 ASCO meeting, the author, 
Bezwoda, reported continued positive results of follow-up from 
this trial while four other RCTs from the U.S. and Europe reported 
disappointing results from HDC compared to standard 
chemotherapy. 
Bezwoda’s results led to an on-site audit of his research data by 
an international committee which reported egregious and unethical 
discrepancies in the work, including that no participant in the trial 
had signed an informed consent.25 His trial publication was 
ultimately retracted in 2001.26 
The first full publication of the largest RCT of HDC with 
ABMT/SCT for metastatic breast cancer to date came from 
Edward A. Stadtmauer, et al., at the University of Pennsylvania, 
and was first published online by the New England Journal of 
Medicine in March 2000 (and in the print journal in April 2000).27  
                                                          
24 W.R. Bezwoda et al., High-dose Chemotherapy With Hematopoietic 
Rescue as Primary Treatment for Metastatic Breast Cancer: A Randomized 
Trial, 13 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 2483-89 (1995). 
25 R.B. Weiss et al., High-Dose Chemotherapy for High-Risk Primary 
Breast Cancer: An On-Site Review of the Bezwoda Study, 335 LANCET 999, 999-
1003 (2000). 
26 Retraction, 19 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 2973 (2001). 
27 Edward A. Stadtmauer et al., Conventional-Dose Chemotherapy 
Compared with High-Dose Chemotherapy Plus Autologous Hematopoietic 
Stem-Cell Transplantation for Metastatic Breast Cancer, 342 NEW ENG. L. REV. 
1069, 1069-76 (2000). 
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Stadtmauer found no significant difference in overall survival rate 
between HDC and standard dose chemotherapy. Several more 
RCTs eventually published full results over the few years that 
came to essentially the same conclusions as ECRI did in its 1995 
report. 
IV. WHAT WE CAN DO TO PREPARE FOR THE NEXT PERFECT 
STORM: RECOMMENDATIONS 
We make two recommendations for judges. First, that 
participating in training sessions on the nature and use of scientific 
methods in medical research is valuable for judges. This is based 
on our experience in presenting the HDC case study to 
approximately 80 federal and state judges and engaging with them 
in dialogue about the value of those sessions. The sessions are not 
intended to turn judges into statisticians or medical researchers. 
Rather, the intent was to introduce the concepts of medical 
research enterprise as it exists today, and as it has existed 
historically. Revisiting the past to review what has taken place and 
learn how we can better the system in the future is important. 
Judges involved in the HDC cases of the 1990s could have asked 
more penetrating questions if they have been exposed both to the 
historical record and to the techniques for discerning credible 
evidence that are available today. 
Our second recommendation is to develop a bench book for 
adjudicating medical technology cases. Such a book could provide 
informational tools for pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures that 
involve evidence from health services research. Because so many 
dynamic cases are in the courts today, the bench book should be 
underpinned with an ongoing relational database of cases that use 
health services research as evidence. For example, the database 
would have fields that categorize the specific disease or ailment 
that is the subject of the case, the treatment or technology in 
question, the procedural posture of the case, the type of health 
services research entered into evidence or referred to as part of the 
factual record, and relevant precedents. Other data fields may 
include, where available, the specific type of defendant (e.g., 
health plan, third-party administrator, employer), whether 
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alternative dispute resolution was utilized, precedents that were 
cited, and other information. The database would feed 
development of the bench book itself and provide fodder for 
research articles for publication. 
One section of the bench book would include a glossary and 
nomenclature of evidentiary terms derived from health services 
research, illustrated by the case law and amplified by explanation 
of the sources and the validity of the scientific foundation of the 
case law would be cited, as appropriate. For example, mention of a 
“consensus statement” that appeared in a case would be defined, 
noting whether it was produced by the National Institutes of 
Health, a clinical specialty society, or a pharmaceutical company, 
and what the distinctions among these are. 
Another section of the bench book would be a procedural 
checklist. That is, there would be a description of typical 
adjudication procedures in which evidence for health services 
research is proffered. This could be subdivided into sections such 
as the stages of a trial (e.g., status conference, discovery, motion to 
dismiss). It would discuss the evidentiary tools applied in each of 
the professional benchmarks. It would note when health services 
research has been used and also where it might be used in the 
future. 
A third section would include “frequently asked questions” that 
presiding judges are likely to encounter. For example, “What 
factors, other than a review of relevant health services research, 
might go into an insurer’s coverage decision?”  Or, “What is the 
meaning of FDA ‘approval’ for a pharmaceutical or medical 
device?” 
A fourth section of the bench book would contain resources or 
examples of instructions which judges could offer to a jury to 
enable them to weigh the medical evidence presented by expert 
witnesses. For example, there could be a subsection on 
“exceptional introduction of evidence” including clinical practice 
guidelines, technology assessments, and other clinical protocols. 
There could also be a subsection on application and amici briefs 
that considers the use of evidence that was not proffered at trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
The authors believe that educational and informational tools 
can make a significant positive impact on the judicial system, the 
medical system, and on the ultimate beneficiary of our efforts—the 
patient. 
 
